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ABSTRACT: The corresponding impact on china’s banking system is becoming the focus issues of 
international economy and has become the major theoretical and practical issues for China to deal with the 
increasingly complex international economic situation. Since 2004 the formation mechanism reform started, 
China’s banking system experienced a steady development and the supervision on banking fragility keeps 
pace with times to meet the requirement of operation. How to measure a bank’s operational performance is 
not get to a conclusion in academic field. This paper aims to review the measurement of banking fragility 
index of Western and Eastern world and using data on Chinese banks to develop an index of banking 
fragility and subsequently examine the factors affecting the index. Industry analysis will be introduced in this 
paper. The academic debates on factors affecting banking fragility index are analyzed and this paper will 
choose a number of widely-used index for the regression test. The findings about the effective 
countermeasures to the banking fragility Chinese banks facing as well as the objectives of the financial 
reform are discussed. A conclusion presents the resulting implications for further research.  
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Introduction 
A stable bank fragility index is important to economy growth of a country. It can also lead to a new 
financial policy or an unexpected bank run. Since formation mechanism reform of China’s banking 
system in 2004, it experienced a steady development of China’s banking system. Especially after 
the 2008 worldwide financial crisis, compared with European and American national banks, 
China’s banking system achieved a remarkable result. Chinese banks are still facing high risks 
which cannot be neglected. The pressure on the non-performing loans continued to grow 
worldwide. Under the conditions that the country's commercial banks are weak on financial 
strength, inadequate on capital, not perfect on operating mechanism, unreasonable on management 
models and shortage on talent pool, it is significant to study China's commercial banking system's 
fragility, determine their trend and give rationalized and feasible countermeasures and suggestions 
to enhance the stability of China's banking system. The subsequently developed bank monitoring 
policies and the corresponding impact on china’s economy are becoming the focus issues of 
international economy, and also has become the major theoretical and practical issues for China to 
deal with the increasingly complex international economic situation which must be faced up to. 
First, this paper will explore China’s bank fragility index based on local research and 
Kaminsky (1998, 26-28)’s method using the bank’s data from 2007 to 2018. Second, this paper will 
find what indicators affect the BFI in China. Third, this paper will explore whether China should 
actively promote the reform of financial environment mechanism while taking the initiative, in a 
controllable and gradual manner. In the meantime, it will also put forward countermeasures which 
China may take facing different situations and recommendations on the reform of the banking 
system policy. 
China’s current banking system 
With the first Japanese bank opened in Beijing in 1980, the liberalization of Chinses banking 
system has started. At the end of 1990s, under the huge effect of Asian financial crisis, the ratio of 
China’s non-performing loan has dramatically increased to 30%-40% of total loan. (Ran Li, Xiang 
Li, Wen Lei and Yiping Huang, 2015,72) 
Although mainland China has survived from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, but not until 
2006, The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) announced its approval for nine 
foreign-funded banks to start their preparatory work in China. (PwC financial report, 2016, 28) 
Meanwhile CBRC is committed to comply with the following regarding the foreign bank 
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restrictions cancellation, the RMB business and the foreign currency business of foreign banks: (a) 
all restrictions on the target customers to foreign banks in dealing foreign exchange business are 
supposed to be already cancelled; (b) all current unnecessary measures regarding the issuing 
licenses will be cancelled; (c) foreign invested financial leasing companies may, in accordance with 
the same conditions for Chinese financial leasing companies, provide financial leasing services. 
(Javier Serrado and Banco Sabadell 2003, 3) 
Due to the rapidly growth of economy in China, good investment environment, there is a huge 
increase of foreign Banks in mainland China including their branches. Statistics show that foreign 
banks now account for about 1.26% of the total market share in China. These market shares are 
hold by 1013 foreign banks from 21 areas in the world. (The World Bank 2018, 6) 
Foreign Banks are more competitive in capital strength, international network, management 
experience compared with Chinese commercial banks. Their significant advantages are risk 
management and risk control. In the wake of the Asian crisis a decade ago and even more recently, 
during the banking crises in Argentina and Turkey, policymakers have been making pro‐active 
efforts to restructure their banking systems (Hoelscher and Ingves 2006, 13-15). There are 
following advantages of the entry of foreign banks: (a) It will improve local banks service standard. 
(b) It will deepen the recapitalization of the society. (c) Local banks can modify the remaining 
management method in order to reduce management risks. At the same time, foreign Bank’s entry 
strengthens the competition between banks in the financial market. (Ghosh 2010, 24) It is obvious 
that the local banks has lack of capital, unsound management mechanism, unreasonable 
management mode compared with foreign banks, this will no doubt increases the overall risk of 
Chinese commercial Banks and increases their vulnerability, at last results in the decrease of the 
ability to resist risk.  
On the other hand, as one of America's largest trading partner, the outbreak of the subprime 
crisis in the United States not only bring direct losses to China's commercial Banks which involved 
in foreign investment, but also brought huge influence to the export of China. The U.S. subprime 
mortgage crisis caused its domestic consumption sharply shrinking which directly scroll down 
China’s export volume. Export income takes a crucial part in GDP of China. China’s economy is 
almost an export-oriented economy; this makes a large impact on the country's macro economy. So, 
the U.S. subprime crisis made a negative impact on the the commercial banking system in China, to 
some extent, increased their vulnerability. 
Methodology and Main Findings 
The ratio of credit to GDP growth and the Chinese banking system fragility is significantly 
correlated, the inflation rate and current account/GDP ratio has weakly significant correlation with 
the fragility of the banking system, while the GDP growth rate, the fiscal deficit/GDP and the stock 
market price-earnings ratio have very low correlation with the fragility of the banking system (Han 
2000, 33). 
Liquidity factors are the main factors due to Ming Zheng (2003, 48-50)’s research, but its 
effectiveness was significantly decreased, while the effectiveness of credit risk and market risk does 
not decline, contrary show a rising trend since year 2005. She doesn’t choose NPL ratio when 
constructing the model, she thinks that the source of the data does not accurately reflect the real 
situation of banks in China.  
A non-linear (downward opening direction parabolic) relationship is found in Zhiqiang (2012, 
91-94)’s paper between liquid assets and profitability and the strikingly different behaviour of 
liquid management of four major state-owned commercial banks and ten share-holding commercial 
banks. This study also found that four state-owned commercial banks and shareholding commercial 
banks have a completely different mobility management model, the state take responsibility of 
commercial banks' liquidity risk and insolvency risk and provide implicit guarantee, so the four 
major banks reduce liquid assets and configure more high-yield assets. 
The main reasons of Asian crisis are Moral Hazard and Overinvestment suggested by 
Krugman (1998) as a New Keynesian economics and Ming Zheng (2003, 51-52). They believe that 
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government and financial institutions have such implicit transactions and will continue to do so to 
make prices stable. The government takes too much responsibility for banking system. The 
vulnerability of China's financial system is caused by state-controlled financial system and 
subsidies policy within the system as Yingli (2002, 14-15) argued.  
Nonbank institutions’ excessive debt in China are blamed to lead to banking system fragility. 
It brings forward that bad debt is the basic reason of Asian financial crisis and a surefire borrower 
credit risk identification system is very necessary not only for Asian bank but also for the whole 
world banking system. 
Other argues that information asymmetry is the main reason of China’s bank fragility and this 
reason takes more and more important place in China. Researches point out that the degree of 
openness and commercial bank fragility of the banking system; foreign banks entrance and the 
number of crises is both negatively correlated. 
Analysis on the relevant data of the commercial banks from 1991-2000 shows that noting of 
the vulnerability of commercial banking system are due to the following factors: inflation rate, fixed 
asset investment growth rate, fiscal deficits, deposit and loan spreads, import growth rate, etc. 
Hongbo (2004, 8) in his paper proposes state-owned commercial banking system fragility are 
affected by macroeconomic factors more than microeconomic factors; the interest rate, growth rate, 
inflation rate is the most important reason of bank fragility. Wei (2005, 48-56) did her empirical 
research of the institutional analysis variables and achieved a good regression result, confirmed the 
main factor of the vulnerability of China's banking system is the supporting institutional factors.  
Summarized above literature, the most common factors regarding to China’s bank fragility 
are shown in below table 1.1. 
 Table 1.1 Micro and Macro Factors Regarding to China’s Bank Fragility Macro(4)	 Micro(5)	
GDP	growth	rate	 CPI	
Capital	account	openness	ratio	
Changes	in	exchange	rate	
Capital		Adequacy		Ratio	
NPL	ratio	
The	average	return	on	net	assets	
RMB	deposit	ratio	
Foreign	currency	deposit	ratio	
 
This paper follows the Xiliang Liu, Xin Zeng (2011, 25-32)’s BFI equation in his research. A 
comprehensive BFI equation should clearly reflect the following three factors: liquidity, stability, 
profitability. Deposit ratio for both RMB and foreign currency, NPL ratio and ROE ratio, these 
indicators take on board the three major dimensions of banking operations: stability, liquidity and 
profitability. (Demirguc Kunt and Huizinga, 2004, 377, 380, 390-398) 
To construct the BFI, we proceed as follows. For any year i, the index for the ith dimension, 
BFIi, is given by the expression: 
 				(1)	
Where RDBC represents RMB deposit ratio; µ represents the indicator’s arithmetic mean; σ 
represents the indicator’s Standard deviation. The significance of BFI is as follows: (a) the 
construction of BFI makes the above four indexes behave according to chi-square distribution. 
Based on the bank’s time series data, we can describe the variation trend of BFI of the bank which 
reflects the variations of the bank’s fragility. (b) When the surveyors limit the Index within a given 
confidence interval, we can figure out the range of values of BFI. If the actual value of BFI is 
beyond the range, the bank is in fragile state this year. (c) If we put the critical values of the above 
four indexes that are regulated by supervision department into the formula, we can calculate a value 
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of BFI. When the actual value of BFI is smaller than the set value, the bank is instable situation this 
year according to the supervision standards; when the actual value is bigger than the set value, the 
bank is in fragile situation this year according to the supervision standards. (d) if we have enough 
quantity of the samples collected from the bank, the accuracy will improve when we use the Index 
to estimate the level of the bank’s fragility. (e) We can further expand BFI by bringing into more 
indexes, such as macroeconomic index. Therefore, we can use the deviation degree of the actual 
value of BFI from the average historical data to estimate the level of the bank’s fragility and the 
probability of calculating the level of fragility without relying on the sample data of bank failures or 
crisis. It also possesses early warning function and is suitable to China. The disadvantage is that the 
high accuracy of BFI requires a large amount of historical data of samples collected from the bank. 
The data for the analysis is drawn from "China Financial Yearbook", "China Statistical 
Yearbook", China Economic Information Network statistics database, China Banking Regulatory 
Commission Annual Report, Thomason One Banker database and World Economic Outlook by 
IMF and CBRC annual report. 
Table 1.2 Summary statistics of the whole industry data and generated BFI of China  
 RDCB NPL ROE BFI  RDCB NPL ROE BFI 
2007 0.7689 0.1175  0.1085  4.5337(1)  2013 0.6687 0.0482  0.1794  2.8098(0)  
2008 0.7392 0.1100  0.0928  3.5200(1) 2014 0.6772 0.0176  0.1485  0.6164(0)  
2009 0.7506 0.1065  0.1281  1.9360(0)  2015 0.6807 0.0126  0.1375  0.3800(0)  
2010 0.7045 0.0958  0.1452  0.0606(0)  2016 0.6820 0.0100 0.1160 0.9350(0) 
2011 0.6810 0.0750  0.1525  0.5824(0)  2017 0.6982 0.0095 0.1050 1.3419(0) 
2012 0.7239 0.0635 0.1713 1.5947(0) 2018 0.6539 0.0097 0.1794 3.7729(1) 
 
China's commercial banking system is fragile between 2007 and 2009, which is the period of the 
worldwide financial crisis. In 2007, affected by the RMB inflation as well as the outbreak of 
American financial crisis, banks in China face higher fragility (Dwight H. Perkins, 2018, 141). 
From 2018, due to the intense economic relationship with US, the BFI was increasing gradually and 
achieved the alarming line.  
The RDCB in 1993 in China is 113%, it decreased to 80.3% till 2000 and drop to 60%-70% 
level. Banks have enough liquidity to offend the risks (Ran Li, Xiang Li, Wen Lei and Yiping Huan 
2015, 75). Since 1999, the state council set up four financial asset management companies who will 
take charge of stripping off non-performing loans from financial institutions, according to CBRC 
2011 annual report, as of to June 2010 total amount of stripped non-performing loans of financial 
institutions is 2.0389 trillion RMB, the non-performing loans of foreign currency is up to 33.35 
billion RMB. But through the test with confidence level of 95%, the model shows that the NPL 
ratio is the primary issue that plagues China's banking fragility. 
ROE is closely relative to the vulnerability of the bank, blind pursuit of profit and maximize 
profit exits in China's banking industry, thus management level may ignore the asset quality, 
resulting in the improvement of the non-performing loan ratio and increase in the vulnerability ratio 
of the bank. 
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Further statistic test on macroeconomic factors 
We already generated BFI using 3 main significant microeconomic factors. To what extend the 
macroeconomic factors affect the index will be discussed in this chapter. We construct LS model to 
test the correlation between BFI and main macroeconomic factors. The dependent variable y is the 
BFI described earlier. Independent variables include 4 macroeconomic variables in the basic 
equation: x1: GDP; x2: CPI; x3: Capital account openness ratio; x4: changes in exchange rate. We 
standardized x1 to x4 by equation (2) and take ln for each serious (for adjusted y= y-
minimum/maximum-minimum) gathered data are shown in below table1.3. 
 												(2)		Table	1.3	Draft	Data	for	BFI	Regression		
Year lny lnx1 lnx2 lnx3 lnx4
2002 0.693 0. 401 0. 483 0. 693 0. 040
2003 0.573 0. 348 0. 161 0. 302 0. 693
2004 0.354 0. 271 0. 007 0. 058 0. 145
2005 0.000 0. 197 0. 090 0. 013 0. 002
2006 0.110 0. 116 0. 123 0. 187 0. 185
2007 0.295 0. 028 0. 061 0. 330 0. 005
2008 0.479 0. 000 0. 188 0. 099 0. 192
2009 0.117 0. 013 0. 465 0. 036 0. 390
2010 0.069 0. 112 0. 001 0. 000 0. 000
2011 0.179 0. 325 0. 123 0. 012 0. 010
2012 0.252 0. 497 0. 238 0. 006 0. 063
2013 0.604 0. 693 0. 693 0. 272 0. 169  
 
In order to analysis to what extend the independent variables affect the BFI, we construct model: 
 
	
Here β_i is coefficient and µ is random variable. Regression results in R: 
 
 
 
According to data in the table, the model estimated as: 
	
R-squared 0.7234 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5654 
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The p value of each observation shown as below table 1.4: 
Table 1.4 P Value Result 
 X1 X2 X3 X4 
P value 0.094 0.078 0.005 0.307 
 
Given significance level a = 0.05, The p value of X3 is smaller than a. Hence the coefficient on 
capital account openness ratio is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that greater 
changes in capital account openness ratio leads to an improvement in banking BFI. The magnitudes 
indicate: a 10% rise in changes in capital account openness ratio raises banking fragility by roughly 
5%. The macro indicators have no remarkable effect on the fragility index of banks, but still should 
not be ignored. According to the model, macro indicators failed the statistical test, it may cause by 
that the financial economic transition period China is in which is not yet fully market-oriented. The 
current bank vulnerability more rely on microcosmic body. However, we still find through the 
regression model that the changes of exchange rate has obvious effect on BFI, this reminds us that 
at the same time, with the acceleration development of China's financial and economic 
marketization, we need to keep a close eye on the impact of macroeconomic factors. 
Conclusion 
Monitoring ultimate owner of lender takes an important role in maintaining China's financial 
market stability and reduces the vulnerability of the banking system for the short term is necessary. 
Eliminate the bank depositors caused by panic can make the economy in a stable level. At the same 
time we must see that compared with foreign advanced control network belonging to a more 
extensive management pattern, China's policy of ultimate owner remediation has the shadow of old 
policy. No matter in what kind of risk central bank would bail out, this made commercial banks 
ignore risks that already exist. The Moral Hazard thereby significantly increasing instability 
(Weiqun 2006, 28-31). What to do reasonably for central bank is that seize the best opportunity to 
rescue, at the same time avoid the transition of the ultimate owner from one firm to another or 
typically from parent company to is subsidiaries. 
As for the Long-term strategy: Strengthening bank balance sheets. The government has 
borrowed heavily to recapitalize banks and take NPLs off their books. In 1998, it issued $32 billion 
in bonds to recapitalize the banking sector. In 1999-2000, bonds were issued by four asset 
management companies (one for each SCB) to absorb approximately $170 billion of bad 
loans.( Xuguang and Luo 2005, 25-30) Chinese commercial banks are now adopting balance sheet 
criteria that reflect international practices; for example, as recommended under the 1988 Basle 
Accord, risk-based capital ratios of 8% are being maintained, although there is concern among 
some analysts that the Basle criteria understate the riskiness of assets held. Loan-loss provisions are 
now to reflect asset quality, and since the beginning of 2001, they are gradually reaching levels of 
100% compared to 1% of loan balances previously (Zhiqiang 2012, 93). Financial statement 
definitions are also gradually being brought in line with international standards. 
Using commercial lending criteria. According to legislation and rules adopted in the mid-
1990s, banks now must base lending on commercial criteria. At present, this policy is being adopted 
gradually throughout China. (Wei 2005, 51-54) To reduce risk exposure, loans must be made 
against collateral, banks must assess borrower creditworthiness, and loans to a single borrower must 
not exceed 10% of bank capital (Yu Kang, Ling Ling, Meng Luo, 2012, 10-11). To shield banks 
from political pressure, individuals and nonbank organizations may not interfere in bank operations. 
Commercial banks may not give unsecured loans to related parties or provide secured loans on 
preferential terms. 
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Improving globalization. More Chinese firms and banks are listing their shares, exposing them to 
market discipline. The top 100 firms listed in China's stock exchanges have some state ownership 
(Ran Li, Xiang Li, Wen Lei and Yiping Huan 2015, 88). The Bank of Shanghai welcomed three 
international shareholders, including the global banking giant Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBC) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) under the World Bank, which 
hold 8 percent and 7 percent respectively of the Shanghai Bank's shares. In a recent development, 
an Australian bank has established a joint-venture with CCB, the largest provider of private housing 
loans in the country to process mortgages (Perkins, 2018, 148-153). Banks also are required to 
introduce governing boards and are to be audited by an approved accounting firm. 
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